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This paper is a brief (and hopelessly incomplete) non-standard introduction to the philosophy of space and 
time. It is an introduction because I plan to give an overview of what I consider some of the main questions 
about space and time: Is space a substance over and above matter? How many dimensions does it have? Is 
space-time fundamental or emergent? Does time have a direction? Does time even exist? Nonetheless, this 
introduction is not standard because I conclude the discussion by presenting the material with an original 




Scientific realists believe that our best scientific theories could be used as reliable guides 
to understand what the world is like. First, they tell us about the nature of matter: for 
instance, matter can be made of particles, or two-dimensional strings, or continuous 
fields. In addition, whatever matter fundamentally is, it seems there is matter in space, 
which moves in time. The topic of this paper is what our best physical theories tell us 
about the nature of space and time.  
I will start in the next section with the traditional debate concerning the question 
of whether space is itself a substance or not. Section 3 is focused instead on the question 
of the dimensionality of space in light of string theory and quantum mechanics. I will 
then continue in Section 4 explaining how quantum gravity may suggest that space and 
time are not fundamental but emergent. In section 5, I discuss whether physical theories 
successfully suggest the passage of time is illusory, and whether change does not exist. I 
conclude the discussion illustrating how the primitive ontology approach to fundamental 
physical theory can shed some new light on to the issues discussed.  
2. Is Space a Substance?  
Material things seems to be arranged in space, but is that true? There are two positions: 
either there is space, and objects are arranged within it; or there is no space over and 
above the spatial relations between the objects. The first position, known as 
substantivalism, was first suggested by Newton and was heavily criticized by Leibniz. 
According to Leibniz, there is no absolute ‘here’ or ‘there,’ ‘now’ or ‘then;’ rather there 
are just spatial and temporal relations between material objects. This view is known as 
relationism: all motion is relative motion. 
2.1. Arguments for Substantivalism 
Newton’s suggestion is that space and time are absolute, immutable quantities which 
provide the fundamental arena in which matter can exist and evolve. This view has been 
developed in the framework of classical (or Newtonian) mechanics but can also be 
generalized to other theories. Newton provided an argument, the bucket argument, to 
show that only substantivalism is able to account for certain observations. Consider a 
bucket of water hanged with a winded up rope. When the rope is let go and the bucket 
starts to rotate, the water’s surface becomes concave. Why? The substantivalist’s response 
is that it is accelerating with respect to absolute space. Instead, on the relationist view 
there has to be a body with respect to which the water will rotate, and the problem is that 
there is no such body: it cannot be the bucket itself (the water and the bucket are at rest 
with one another at the end when the water is concave, but also at the beginning when 
the water was not concave; the water was in motion relative to the bucket in the 
intermediate state, yet the water was not concave); it cannot be motion with respect of 
the walls of the room (“put the walls on wheels and spin them around a bucket of water, 
and the water will not go concave” [Dasgupta 2015]).  
2.2. Arguments against Substantivalism  
Leibniz argued against substantivalism, suggesting that it is fundamentally problematic. 
Leibniz observes that a ‘shifted’ world,  a world just like ours except that all matter is 
shifted in another place in absolute space without any change in the relations of one object 
to another, will count as a different world for the substantivalist, even if the two worlds 
do not differ in their fundamental properties. The same is true for a ‘boosted’ world, a 
world just like ours except that all matter is drifting through space at uniform velocity. 
Leibniz concludes that this is absurd because it violates either the principle of sufficient 
reason or the principle of identity of indiscernibles, namely that God had a reason to 
create the world exactly as it is, and that indiscernible possibilities are identical. 
 One can easily resist these arguments denying such principles are true, but there is a 
stronger argument against substantivalism based on symmetries that generalizes to 
theories other than Newtonian mechanics, as we will see. Translations and rotations are 
symmetry of shape: they are transformations that leave the shape of an object the same. 
Similarly, it is argued that symmetries of a law are transformations that preserve that law. 
In classical mechanics, shifts and boosts are symmetries: if w1 is a classical world, then a 
world w2 shifted 5 feet to the left will also be classical; likewise, a boosted world w3.  By 
definition, F is an invariant feature of a law if any two worlds related by a symmetry of 
the law agree on the values of F [Dasgupta 2015]. In classical mechanics, only relative (as 
opposed to absolute) distances and velocities are invariant: w1, w2 and w3 are governed 
by the same laws, regardless of their absolute position and absolute velocity. This 
suggests that (all things being equal) invariant features are the only ones we should think 
of as real: if F is not preserved in symmetries, then there are systematic ways to alter its 
values and yet preserve the law. Tus, they ‘do not make any difference’ in the law, they 
are redundant or irrelevant [North 2009], [Baker 2010]. In addition (or alternatively), non-
invariant features are by definition undetectable, and thus we do not have any reason to 
believe they exist [Dasgupta 2015]. In both cases, substantivalism is in trouble since 
according to her absolute position and velocity are real, even if they are not invariant. 
There is consensus among substantivalists that the symmetry argument against 
absolute velocity is compelling. Thus they endorse Galilean substantivalism, in which 
absolute acceleration is defined without reference to absolute velocity. Like in Newtonian 
substantivalism, bodies traveling in straight lines have no acceleration, but differently 
from it, there is no fact of the matter about absolute velocities: a vertical straight trajectory 
in space-time or a tilted one will not be different. A body is accelerating only if it has a 
curved trajectory in space-time. The majority of substantivalists think that the symmetry 
argument against absolute position instead does not work. ‘Sophisticated’ 
substantivalists (see e.g. [Butterfield 1989]) argue that they are not committed to maintain 
that the shifted and the actual worlds are different, as claimed by the relationists (see 
[Dasgupta 2015]).  
The situation does not change much when we consider relativistic physics, in which 
we move from space and time to space-time, combined into a unique manifold.  
Therefore, space substantivalism arguably transforms into space-time (or manifold) 
substantivalism, the doctrine that the manifold of events in space-time is a substance. The 
basic idea of general relativity is that matter changes the geometry of space-time, curving 
it. Therefore, a crucial element is the metric, which captures all the geometric structure of 
space-time. The most famous (symmetry) argument against substantivalism in this 
framework is the ‘hole’ argument [Stachel 1989], [Earman-Norton 1987]. Since there is no 
privileged coordinate system (the so-called general covariance of general relativity), we 
can ‘spread’ metric and matter in space-time in different ways without changing 
invariant properties. For instance, we can have a ‘regular’ translation of matter and 
metric, or we could have a ‘hole’ transformation: smoothly joined, we leave matter and 
metric unchanged outside the hole, and we spread them differently inside. Since the two 
distributions agree on all invariant features (i.e. on coordinate-independent properties 
such as the distance along spatial curves), they arguably describe the same physical 
situation. The problem is that according to manifold substantivalism they instead depict 
two distinct physical situations, characterized by undetectable non-invariant properties. 
The most popular response to the ‘hole’ argument is again sophisticated 
substantivalism: one can regard these distributions as representing the same physical 
possibility (see [Pooley 2013]). Another response is ‘metric essentialism:’ contrarily to 
manifold substantivalism, points in space-time possess their relations essentially. That is, 
the metric is, so to speak, part of the container [Maudlin 1990].  
3. How Many Dimensions Does Space Have?  
Another interesting question is what dimensions space (or space-time) has. In Newtonian 
mechanics and relativity theory, matter is represented respectively by three-dimensional 
entities evolving in time,  or by four-dimensional ‘worms’ in space-time so it seems 
obvious that space has three dimensions, and space-time four. The situation changes in 
the framework of string theory and non-relativistic quantum mechanics. 
3.1. Quantum Mechanics  and Wave Function Realism 
Classical mechanics dominated physics until the 20th century, when quantum mechanics 
and relativity were proposed as more successful alternatives. To get a clear metaphysical 
picture of the world out of quantum mechanics is notoriously difficult and controversial. 
The problem is that if, as quantum mechanics states, the complete description of any 
material object is provided by the so-called wave function, and the wave function evolves 
in time according to the equation developed by Schrödinger, then objects may have 
contradictory properties, like ‘being here’ and ‘being not here’ at the same time, which is 
extremely problematic. Nonetheless, in the last century few better quantum theories have 
been developed, most famously Bohmian mechanics [Bohm 1952], Everettian mechanics 
[Everett 1957], and the GRW theory [GRW 1986]. Bohmian mechanics avoids the 
inconsistencies of ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics denying that the wave function 
provides the complete description, Everettian mechanics that it’s problematic for objects 
to have contradictory properties as long as they are instantiated in different words, and 
the GRW theory denies that the wave function evolves according to the Schrödinger 
equation.  
3.2. An Argument for Wave Function Realism  
Nevertheless, it is controversial what matter is made of. One possibility is ‘wave function 
realism:’ the wave function represents matter in all the three theories above, even if they 
differ by either adding something to the wave function (like Bohmian or Everettian 
mechanics, which add particles and worlds), or modifying its dynamics. This view is 
motivated by focusing on the dynamics [North 2013]: since in Newtonian mechanics the 
fundamental equation described the temporal evolution of three-dimensional points, 
then matter is made of point-particles in three-dimensional space. Similarly, since the 
fundamental equation of quantum theory, Schrödinger’s equation, describes the 
evolution of the wave function, whatever object the wave function mathematically 
represents it is the fundamental constituent of matter, and space is whatever space the 
wave function lives in [Albert 1996], [Lewis 2004], [Ney 2012]. This space, introduced in 
the classical framework, is called ‘configuration space:’ the space of the configurations of 
all the particles in the world (given that matter is made of wave function, there are 
fundamentally particles, so the name ‘configuration’ should not be taken literally). Thus, 
if there are N particles in the universe (estimated to be 1080), the dimension of 
configuration space is 3N. If so, contrarily to what our everyday experiences suggest, 
space is a very high dimensional space.  
3.3. Arguments against Wave Function Realism 
One problem for this view is that it cannot account for our experience of three-
dimensional objects [Monton 2002], [Maudlin 2007], [Allori 2013a]. One could argue that 
they exist ‘functionally’ rather than fundamentally [Albert 1996]. The preliminary 
problem here is that there are infinitely many functions from configuration space to three-
dimensional space, and to select a privileged one amounts to add an ontology, which the 
wave function realist denies. Other proposals use symmetries [Ney forthcoming], or 
grounding [North 2013]. These approaches are all work-in-progress, and the debate over 
which is more promising is still open.  
In addition, wave function realism may not be viable in the framework of quantum 
field theories [Wallace-Timpson 2010], [Myrvold 2015]. A first problem is that the 
definition of configuration space requires that the number of particles does not change in 
time, contrarily to what happens in quantum field theories, in which particles are created 
and annihilated. See most notably [Ney 2013] for a strategy to address this problem. 
Furthermore, some question the motivation for the approach: wave function realism 
prescribes that the world is very different from what we perceive it to be. Before accepting 
such a revisionary metaphysic, one should rule out the existence of viable, less 
counterintuitive alternatives. Since they exist (see Section 6), it is difficult to see the appeal 
of wave function realism [Monton 2002], [Allori 2013b]. This is connected with the so-
called problem of empirical incoherence [Maudlin 2007]. Loosely speaking, a theory is 
supported by observations when it predicts that objects have certain features, and these 
features are actually observed. Since our observations are all observations of three-
dimensional objects (pointer pointing in certain directions in three-dimensional space), a 
theory should make predictions about them. Wave function realism predicts instead that 
there are no three-dimensional object, so it cannot be supported by observations. Wave 
function realists (see e.g. [Ney 2015]) respond that they do not deny three-dimensional 
object exists, rather they deny that they are fundamental, and accordingly they attempt 
to provide an account of how they emerge from a deeper reality.  
3.4. String Theory and Extra Dimensions  
Quantum field theory, the first proposed extension of quantum mechanics in a relativistic 
framework, is mathematically ill-defined. In order to overcome such difficulties, string 
theory, among other theories, has been proposed. In this theory, matter is described by 
one-dimensional objects called strings. On distances larger than the string scale, a string 
looks just like an ordinary particle, with properties determined by the vibrational state of 
the string.  Since one of them corresponds to the graviton, a particle connected to gravity, 
string theory promises to be a unified description of all the fundamental forces. There are 
several versions of string theory, but for their mathematical consistency, they all require 
extra dimensions of space-time: for instance, in ‘superstring’ theory space-time is ten-
dimensional. These extra dimensions are assumed to close up on themselves to form little 
circles, so that they are not macroscopically observable, similarly to what happens when 
we observe a garden hose from a distance and it appears to have only one dimension 
instead of two (this is the so-called ‘compactification’). So, just like in the quantum 
framework the dimensionality of space is not as it seems, but contrarily to the quantum 
case in which the mappings from the high dimensional fundamental space to the 
perceived three-dimensional are arbitrary, here the compactification mechanism is part 
of the definition of the theory.  
 
4. Is Space-Time Fundamental? 
Many additionally have suggested that recent developments in quantum gravity, namely 
the theories that attempt to unify general relativity and quantum mechanics, imply that 
space-time is not fundamental but rather emergent.  
4.1. Arguments for Emergence 
As we saw, string theory was originally developed assuming a space-time background 
(as inert container) but the so-called ‘dualities,’ suggested to some otherwise. As 
symmetries relate possible physical description a given theory to one another, dualities 
connect different types of strung theories. Two theories are said to be dual, roughly, 
whenever they provide the same physics. There are various dualities. T-duality is a kind 
of scale invariance. As we saw, the extra dimensions are compactified but different 
theories have different compactification mechanisms. Suppose in a theory T1 a dimension 
is wrapped around a circle of radius R. It turns out that, schematically, a theory T2 in 
which the dimension is wrapped around a circle of radius 1/R is dual to T1. That is, the 
transformation R l/R leaves the physics invariant. There is no difference between the 
physics generated by T1, in which the space is ‘large,’ and by T2, in which the space is 
‘small.’ Mirror symmetry is the generalization of T-duality: the extra dimensions can be 
compactified so that they form a particular manifold (the Calabi-Yau manifold), which 
turns out to be dual to a manifold with a different topology. Then we have S-duality, 
which connects theories with different coupling constants (that is, the strength of the 
interaction is different): a theory T1 with coupling constant g is dual to a theory T2 with 
coupling constant 1/g. Another duality is the AdS/CFT (Anti-deSitter/Conformal Field 
Theory) duality, which connects a string theory, which includes gravity and is defined in 
ten dimensions on an Anti-deSitter space, with a quantum field theory, which does not 
include gravity, and is defined in three dimensions on the boundary of the AdS space. 
Some have argued that the metaphysical lesson we should draw from dualities is that 
space-time is emergent. The idea is very similar to the symmetry arguments we discussed 
previously, now applied at dualities: if T1 and T2 are dual, they are empirically 
indistinguishable, and we cannot choose between them. Only invariant properties 
describe something real: in the case of T-duality, for instance, there is no fact of the matter 
about whether the space is ‘small’ or ‘large:’ space is not fundamental [Dawid 2013], 
[Huggett-Wuthrich 2013], [Rickles 2013].   
The ‘rival’ of string theory is quantum gravity, in which general relativity is 
quantized. A particular type of quantization leads to canonical quantum gravity, newer 
approaches include loop quantum gravity, in which, arguably, space can be viewed as an 
extremely fine fabric or network of finite loops, called spin networks. The evolution of a 
spin network over time is called a spin foam. The spin network can either persist, fuse or 
split into several nodes, and “the resulting structure is taken to be the quantum analogue 
of a four-dimensional space-time and is called ‘spin foam’”[Huggett Wuthrich 2013]. The 
theory has not been completely developed but the idea is that the spin foam represents 
what is fundamental, rather than space-time, and that the perceived three-dimensionality 
thus have to suitably emerge from such structure.  
4.2. Arguments against Emergence of Space-Time 
The view according to which space-time suitably emerges from a deeper physics faces 
very similar problems as wave function realism: first of all, how to account for the 
appearance of three-dimensional objects evolving in time? Why should we believe the 
theory? [Huggett-Wuthrich 2012] take on the challenges and sketch possible solutions. 
The problem that seems to remain is about the motivation: given that there are 
alternatives, why would one commit to such a radical metaphysical picture?  
5. What about Time?  
So far, we have focused our attention on space, leaving aside many issues regarding the 
nature of time. I wish to outline just two connected questions, leaving aside many other 
interesting debates, namely whether time passes and whether it has a direction.   
5.1. Arguments against the Passage of Time 
The ongoing debate in metaphysics about the nature of time is between those who believe 
that the passage of time is objective, and those who believe that this is just an illusion. 
Some have argued that in the framework of relativity, in which we go from space and 
time to space-time, we should think of time just as another dimension of a bigger 
fundamental space, and that the passage of time is just an illusion (see, e.g. [Goedel 1949]). 
Others instead argue that it is perfectly coherent to believe that time passes in a relativistic 
framework [Maudlin 2002a], [Zimmerman 2007].   
In addition, there is a tension between microscopic laws and macroscopic behavior 
[Albert 2000], [North 2012]. In fact, on the one hand all macroscopic behavior has a 
natural temporal order: eggs break and do not un-break. On the other hand, the 
microscopic laws that govern the macroscopic behavior (whether classical, relativistic or 
quantum) are time-symmetric. That is, if a process is possible, then so is the process run 
backwards. So, why is it possible for the molecules that constitute an egg to follow both 
the trajectories corresponding to ‘the egg breaks’ and to ‘the egg un-breaks,’ while on the 
macroscopic level we only see eggs that break? The problem is to explain where the law 
that describes these macroscopic processes, the second law of thermodynamics according 
to which entropy never decreases, is coming from. Arguably, the puzzle has been solved 
in the framework of statistical mechanics by Boltzmann, in which it is overwhelmingly 
likely for a process to develop towards maximal entropy, but it is possible that entropy 
decreases. As such, eggs can un-break, it is just overwhelmingly unlikely to happen. In 
order for the derivation to go through, many, including Boltzmann, believe that it is 
necessary to assume the so-called ‘past hypothesis,’ the assumption that the universe 
started out with an extremely low entropy. Critics of this strategy complain that this 
condition calls for an explanation [Price 2004], since the probability of the universe 
starting in the requisite state is astronomically small (see [Callender 2004] for a defense).  
5.2. An arguments for the Unreality of Time  
Similarly to the argument for the emergence of space-time, some have argued that 
canonical quantum gravity, one of the contenders to unify general relativity and quantum 
mechanics, suggests time does not exist. Canonical quantum gravity gives rise to the 
Wheeler-de Witt equation for a universal wave function, the interpretation of which 
seems to describe a static universe. How can this theory describe a world like ours in 
which there is change? This is the so-called ‘problem of time’ (for a review, see [HVW 
2012]). The possible reactions to this problem can be either endorse timelessness or to 
attempt to quantize gravity in a different way. For the latter approach, see [Kuchar 1999]. 
The former path has been taken most notably by [Wheeler 1994], [Barbour 2001], [Earman 
2002], [Rovelli, 2011]. In particular, Rovelli’s basic idea is that we can describe change 
without time relating physical systems directly to one another.  
5.3. Arguments against the Unreality of Time 
Objections to this suggestion are of two sorts: some suggests that the lack of change in 
the Wheeler-de Witt equation should not be taken metaphysically seriously, since it is an 
artifact of framing the theory in terms of canonical variables [Maudlin 2002b] [Goldstein-
Teufel 2011]. Others have stressed that it is difficult to see how one can come to believe 
in a theory in which time does not exist [Healey 2002]. As one can see, this is a variety of 
the problem of empirical incoherence mentioned above.  
6. A New Look into the Debates: Primitive Ontology 
If the reader has remained with me up to this point, if we set aside the issues connected 
with the direction of time, I hope she will be able to see a trend: on the one hand we have 
the relationists, the wave function realists, the space-time emergentists, the antirealist 
about time, which essentially resort to the intuition that if something is unobservable then 
we have no reason to believe it is real; on the other hand we have the substantivalists, the 
fundamentalists about space-time (i.e. the critics of wave function realism and of space-
time emergentism), and the realist about time that instead seem to appeal to the idea that 
if something has an explanatory role then we have reason to believe that it exists, even if 
it is not detectable. In fact, many prominent arguments for the former positions are based 
on symmetries and invariant features: in classical mechanics, position and velocities are 
not invariant, and therefore theory are not real; general relativity is covariant, therefore 
space-time points are not real; since there are dualities connecting different string 
theories, we have no reason to believe one theory over the other. These, fundamentally, 
are all varieties of underdetermination arguments, and the opponents of these views 
essentially reply that observability is not the only virtue a theory may possess: 
explanatory power, in particular, should be taken into account.  
The other arguments are slightly different: in quantum mechanics one needs 
nothing more than the wave function in order to account for the experimental results; 
general relativity suggests that space and time are part of the same continuum, so space 
and time are not fundamentally different and time does not pass; in canonical quantum 
gravity we have an equation that suggests that noting evolves in time, so time does not 
exist. Nonetheless, I think there is still something in common with the previous 
arguments: the wave function realist and the antirealist about time start off the bare 
formalism of the theory (respectively quantum mechanics, general relativity and 
canonical quantum gravity) in order to interpret it. In contrast, their opponents 
emphasize that the ‘interpretation’ comes first, and the theory should follow: we make a 
hypothesis about what the world is made of, and then we construct a mathematical 
theory to describe it. In particular, the problems of the macro-object and of empirical 
incoherence stem from this reflection: one theory should be able to account for what we 
experience, they should be able to explain empirical data, and three-dimensional space 
(or four-dimensional space-time) seems to be essential for that.  
In this last section, I wish to briefly describe a unifying account of fundamental 
physical theory that essentially captures the ideas just outlined: the primitive ontology 
approach (for an updated version, see [Allori 2015]). The main idea is that fundamental 
physical theories are about three-dimensional entities which evolve in time (the primitive 
ontology). The prototype of a theory with primitive ontology is classical mechanics, 
according to which macroscopic objects are composed of microscopic three-dimensional 
point-particles, and the temporal evolution of such objects is determined by Newton’s 
equation. The proponents of this view point out the macro object problem and the 
problem of empirical coherence in quantum mechanics and quantum gravity as a 
motivation for their view: that is, theories with a primitive ontology are explanatory 
successful and empirically coherent, in contrast with their rival views. Because of these 
reasons, they propose that not only Bohmian mechanics, but also GRW and Everettian 
mechanics are actually theories about three-dimensional entities, may that be particles, 
or continuous three-dimensional fields, or space-time events (‘flashes’) [AGTZ 2008, 
2011]. The idea is that the wave function does not describe matter, in contrast to what the 
wave function realist believe, but rather should be seen more like a nomological entity, 
needed to implement the law of evolution for the primitive ontology. Similarly, in the 
context of quantum gravity [Goldstein-Teufel 2011] dissolve the problem of time by 
arguing that the metric is the primitive ontology of the theory, whose evolution is 
governed by the wave function, which obeys to the Wheeler-de Witt equation. When 
confronted by dualities in string theory, the primitive ontologist will similarly argue that 
empirical adequacy and observability are not the only virtues a theory should have, and 
that space-time and objects in it are essential to explain theory experiences. Finally, in the 
context of the substantivalism-relationism debate, what does this approach have to say? 
At least one thing: in classical mechanics position is fundamental, being the primitive 
ontology, and symmetry arguments are completely ineffective in this context.  
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